Doomed to cooperate: How American and Russian nuclear scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War Dangers

March 18, 2016 

Siegfried. S. Hecker: Professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation

Nuclear risks changed dramatically when the Soviet Union collapsed. Suddenly the world was threatened more by Russia’s weakness than its strength. Never before had a country with the capacity to destroy the world experienced such turmoil. The United States and much of the world was concerned about loose nukes, nuclear materials, loose nuclear experts and uncontrolled nuclear exports. Scientists and engineers at Los Alamos and other Dept. of Energy nuclear laboratories joined forces with those at the Russian nuclear weapon institutes for more than 20 years to avoid what looked like the perfect nuclear storm. Today’s strained relations between Washington and Moscow have curtailed that cooperation to the detriment of a safer world. This talk is a preview of the two-volume book to appear this spring.


The Iran Nuclear Deal: What It Is, What It Isn’t, and Its Potential Ramifications

November 20, 2015

Cheryl Rofer, Former President of the Los Alamos Committee on Arms Control and International Security

On July 14, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the P5+1 (or E3+3) – the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany. The agreement imposes strict controls on Iran’s nuclear program in return for relief from sanctions imposed on Iran.

Implementation of the agreement is proceeding; Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency are working through the question of what work related to nuclear weapon development Iran may have done, to be capped by a United Nations Security Council resolution on December 15. Both Iran and the United States have completed their internal legislative processes related to the agreement, and October 18 was Adoption Day, when the agreement goes into effect. The next steps are for the P5+1 to develop conditional waivers to the sanctions and for Iran to meet a list of requirements for those waivers to go into effect. This is likely to be completed by spring or summer 2016.

The talk will cover the basics of the agreement and major objections to it.


Still Thinking about the Unthinkable: Maintaining Nuclear Stability through Times of Transition

June 16, 2014

Houston T Hawkins, Senior Fellow, Principal Directorate, Global Security, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Any reduction of the nation’s nuclear arsenal will have consequences, both direct and ancillary. Before the U.S. moves too far in shrinking nuclear stockpiles, many circumstances will need to be carefully evaluated. The following developments would deserve particular attention: foreign force modernizations, especially those which might signify a waning of American technological superiority; the re-emergence of confrontational strategies by countries like China and Russia; nuclear proliferation activities not justified by credible civilian applications; and the strengthening of international terror networks directed against the U.S. and its allies.


The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and its International Implications

August 13, 2009

Ivan Oelrich, Acting President, Federation of American Scientists

An informal discussion with SFWAF board members. (more…)

Iran and Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation

December 11, 2007

Robert G. Gard, Jr. Lt. General, US Army (rtd.), Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation


US and Iran: Confrontation, Compromise or Containment?

June 19, 2006

Cheryl Rofer, National Security blogger


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